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Due to its origins, the field of informality remains disciplinarily unbalanced, with strong 
development of anthropological and sociological research and scarce participation of political 
science, particularly in the realm of international relations. The book The Origins of Informality: 
Why the Legal Foundations of Global Governance are Shifting, and Why It Matters contributes to the 
re-balancing of this equilibrium with research that merges informality and international relations. 
However, this task is not simple, as there has been no systematic problematization of the issue to 
date. Charles Roger’s book aims to answer the question of why states have displayed a tendency to 
create more informal than formal international organizations since the 1970s. 
The first chapter recalls the literature on the topic providing a common framework for the 
two major explanations offered to justify this increasing informality, namely, functionalist and 
power-based accounts. The former argues that international institutions are created to resolve 
the problems states encounter most efficiently, while the latter finds interests and power as the 
real reasons behind their creation. In this sense, more powerful states would opt for informal 
solutions to maintain their independence and flexibility, while weaker states would prefer formal 
institutions to bind all participants to the respect of their decisions. Roger argues that these 
accounts can only partially explain this trend towards informalisation. By carefully surveying 
all organizations created since 1945, he develops a two-step theory largely based on domestic 
politics, concluding that this trend is more effectively explained through the growth of political 
polarization and the complex transformations associated with the emergence of the regulatory 
state (5). Still, the author warns that this theory must be interpreted as complementary, not as an 
alternative to functionalist or power-based explanations. 
The second chapter, then, has the double objective of conceptualizing formal and informal 
institutions and providing evidence of the trend towards informalisation. The conceptualization 
rests on the definition of the characteristics of formal and informal organizations. Both groups of 
international organizations are created by states, but while the former tends to have separate bodies 
producing binding decisions for their members, the latter often depend on states’ willingness to 
respect soft law agreements. This produces a series of functional differences, such as the fact that 
informal organizations are more agile, flexible, and secretive than their formal counterparts. Other 
consequences stemming from these initial differences produce an effect at the domestic level, 
as formal organizations have requirements in terms of treaty ratification, implementation, and 
monitoring that informal ones do not have, while also being a financial burden for member states. 
This conceptualization is important because it creates a way to systematically distinguish between 
formal and informal international bodies. Not all organizations fall in one of these categories, but 
rather than being simple exceptions, they are often transitioning from a less to a more formal 
condition. Thus, Roger adds a dynamic component to his theoretical explanation.
Roger develops a complete database of both formal and informal organizations globally, charting 
a steep growth of the informal ones over the past five decades. This database is fundamental in 
grounding the theory and is explored extensively in the third chapter of the book. The two-step 
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theory revolves around two different moments: the first one is the formation of state preferences, 
and the second one is the aggregation of these preferences. Accordingly, the major reason for 
which a state is more prone to choose a type of organization over another is the type of body 
concerned with solving the international problem. If independent agencies address the issue, the 
state will be keen to create an informal body. If political authorities intervene, then a formal one 
is preferred. Once state preferences are established, the debate moves to the international level 
where bargaining between states with different preferences begins. When predispositions differ, 
the power-based account may be effective in explaining why a specific organization is created. 
Nevertheless, the two-step theory does not assume that stronger states will automatically opt for 
informal bodies. 
The fourth chapter concludes the theoretical discussion with a quantitative analysis that proves 
the reliability and suitability of these different accounts in explaining the origin of informal 
organizations empirically. Even if the correlation at the basis of the analysis cannot be considered 
ultimate evidence to refute a theory, both the functionalist and the two-step theories prove to be 
more grounded than the power-based one. 
The following three chapters rely on a qualitative comparative approach. For example, the author 
analyses the historical reasons that led states to create the International Monetary Fund, a formal 
organization, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, an informal one. The sixth one 
adopts a similar approach, analysing two informal institutions – the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions. In the seventh chapter, 
the author compares an informal organization, the International Competition Network, with a 
formal one, the World Trade Organization. Used as means to prove the validity of the two-step 
theory, the comparisons are mostly effective, though the argument could have been strengthened 
even more with a comparison of formal and informal organizations in every section. 
    
The concluding chapter of the book reflects on the main shortcomings and limitations of the 
study and lists the policy implications. As declared by the author, the book is limited insofar as 
it analyses only the foundational act of organizations. Hence, further research should focus on 
other moments of the lives of organizations. On the other hand, the main shortcoming refers to 
the efficacy of the two-step theory, given that it has been tested neither on organizations created 
before 1945 nor on those yet to be created. Still, this does not affect its applicability on the majority 
of the existing international organizations present in the database. 
The author also presents a final statistic on the relationship between organizations and the 
problem(s) they are expected to solve, finding that 74% of all mismatched bodies are informal 
in nature (208). If there is indeed a move to informality and these bodies are unable to solve the 
problems they face, the policy implication is that political authorities should actively intervene 
to formalise organizations. Brexit and the isolationism of the Trump administration were strong 
signals of an attempt to move away from international cooperation, but as Roger notes, states 
are not monolithic entities. If political authorities withdraw from international cooperation, 
independent agencies take over the responsibility of solving a global issue. In doing so, informal 
bodies with insufficient powers are created, thus compounding the very issues they are tasked 
with solving. 
It is hard to find flaws in this work because of its mixed-methods approach which allows 
for testing the theory on both the macro and micro levels. Furthermore, the book fills a gap 
in the literature for more systematic contributions of researchers from political science and 
international relations. This work is best suited for readers already familiar with the major theories 
of international relations, but the clarity of the writing certainly makes it accessible to anyone 
interested in understanding why we are at this point in international cooperation. Future research 
should focus on the influence of large formal organizations in creating other formal bodies: for 
instance, what was the role of the UN in creating UNICEF? This research brings evidence of the 
growth of informality as a response to the decline of formal institutions. If formal solutions are 
preferable, then we should hope that in the future political authorities will reprise their vacant 
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roles in international cooperation leading to strengthening the role of formal organizations in 
solving complex global problems. 
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